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RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0905  
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1946  
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RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY  
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY  
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RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY 1332  
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2760  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 001444

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TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [PINR](#) [PHUM](#) [KNNP](#) [KDEM](#) [OSCE](#) [AU](#) [KZ](#)

SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: SAUDABAYEV ON NUCLEAR SECURITY  
SUMMIT, RAKHAT ALIYEV, OSCE

REF: A. ASTANA 1328

[1](#)B. ASTANA 1439

Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland: 1.4 (B), (D)

[1](#)1. (C) SUMMARY: During an August 27 meeting, State  
Secretary Kanat Saudabayev told the Ambassador:

-- President Nazarbayev still wants an Oval Office meeting  
when he travels to Washington next spring for the Nuclear  
Security Summit and is willing to be flexible about the  
timing;

-- Kazakhstan remains suspicious that the United States has  
contact with Nazarbayev's exiled ex-son-in-law, Rakhat  
Aliyev, and fears we might offer him asylum; and

-- The Presidency is irked with the OSCE Head of Mission in  
Astana who said in a recent local press interview that  
there's still a one-percent chance Kazakhstan might be denied  
the 2010 OSCE Chairmanship because of democracy and human  
rights issues. END SUMMARY.

NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT

[1](#)2. (C) The Ambassador met with State Secretary Kanat  
Saudabayev on August 27 to give him an interim response to  
the request he had made on August 3 that President Nursultan  
Nazarbayev combine his participation in the Spring 2010  
Nuclear Security Summit in the United States with a bilateral  
visit that would include an Oval Office meeting (ref A). The  
Ambassador told Saudabayev that planning for the Nuclear  
Security Summit is under way and that details should be  
forthcoming. He advised Saudabayev that deliverables for the  
summit will be discussed with participants in advance, and  
noted that about 30 heads of state will be jostling for White  
House attention; however, the Administration has not ruled  
out an Obama-Nazarbayev meeting "sometime in the spring."  
The Ambassador hastened to add that this preliminary  
information does not/not constitute an "official invitation,"

and that he was providing it simply to be responsive to Saudabayev's August 3 request. Saudabayev said he thoroughly understood. He suggested that an optimal scenario, should a bilateral visit be confirmed, would be for Nazarbayev to arrive in Washington three or four days before the summit or stay in the United States after it for three or four days. Nazarbayev would use the extra time to visit New York and possibly the headquarters of international oil companies that are heavily invested in Caspian Sea projects.

RAKHAT ALIYEV REDUX

13. (C) When the brief, business-like meeting seemed to be over, Saudabayev paused and then said, "I need you to look me in the eye and tell me once again that your government has no official contact of any kind with Rakhata Aliyev," Nazarbayev's estranged ex-son-in-law currently exiled in Europe, "and that you will not allow him into the United States. We know that he has 'offered himself' to you." The Ambassador responded, "I can confirm to you that we do not have any kind of contact whatsoever with Aliyev, we do not want any contact with him, and we would not want to see him in the United States because we understand clearly that would be a disaster for the bilateral relationship." The Ambassador cautioned that it is possible Aliyev might have some contact with U.S. journalists, lawyers, or public relations people, but repeated the U.S. government does not have and does not want any sort of contact with Aliyev. He added that if Kazakhstan has listed Aliyev with Interpol, that would help prevent him from inadvertently being issued a visa and slipping into the United States. Saudabayev

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confirmed Kazakhstan has indeed listed Aliyev with Interpol and with "every other agency possible."

14. (C) The Ambassador asked why this Aliyev issue has come up again. Saudabayev responded, "His 'criminal partner' (former KGB Chairman Alnur) Musayev has just turned against him, he will have mounting problems in Austria, we know he is not welcome in London," then he paused and added, "and we continue to have indications 'your people' might want to give him asylum in the United States. That would be a catastrophe." The Ambassador repeated his "do not have contact, do not want contact" mantra. Saudabayev seemed reassured and said, "All right. We trust you. The President believes you personally are seriously trying to build the relationship he wants with the United States. We are pleased that our bilateral relationship has become stable, predictable, positive, and is growing step by step. But it takes two to tango. We are reciprocating President Obama's positive impulses. It appears both sides are trying to be 'understanding realists.'"

DISPLEASURE WITH OSCE AMBASSADOR'S PRESS INTERVIEW

15. (C) Saudabayev said that his government was "perplexed" by OSCE Head of Mission in Kazakhstan, Ambassador Aleksandre Keltchewsky's "intemperate" comments in his two-part interview recently published in the widely read newspaper, "Liter," in which he raised the "one-percent" possibility that Kazakhstan might still be denied the 2010 OSCE Chairmanship because of democracy and human-rights issues. Clearly irritated, Saudabayev said, "I think he needs a dose of 'realistic understanding.' He needs to understand that those who once stood at the barricades now sit at the same table (at the OSCE). The name of that organization includes the word, 'security,' and more attention should be paid to that aspect. Four of the world's nuclear powers are OSCE members, but what has OSCE ever done for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation? Not very much!" (NOTE: Non-proliferation has become one of Saudabayev's signature issues. In fact, on the day of this meeting, he had just returned at 4:00 am from a meeting on nuclear issues in Nagasaki, Japan, where, he said, he had been most impressed by the U.S. head of delegation, Susan Burk. END NOTE.)

Saudabayev concluded, "We fully understand and respect that the OSCE has three dimensions. We would hope that others understand that, too."

"HE'S A CLEVER GUY"

¶6. (C) At the end of the meeting, The Ambassador commented that he had read Presidential Policy Adviser Yermukhamet Yetysbayev's recent "Liter" interview (ref B) very closely and had found it most interesting. Saudabayev smiled enigmatically and said only, "He's a clever guy."  
HOAGLAND